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ABSTRACT
A key performance metric in blockchains is the latency between
when a transaction is broadcast and when it is confirmed (the so-
called, confirmation latency). While improvements in consensus
techniques can lead to lower confirmation latency, a fundamental
lower bound on confirmation latency is the propagation latency of
messages through the underlying peer-to-peer (p2p) network (in
Bitcoin, the propagation latency is several tens of seconds). The de
facto p2p protocol used by Bitcoin and other blockchains is based
on random connectivity: each node connects to a random subset of
nodes. The induced p2p network topology can be highly suboptimal
since it neglects geographical distance, differences in bandwidth,
hash-power and computational abilities across peers. We present
Perigee, a decentralized algorithm that automatically learns an ef-
ficient p2p topology tuned to the aforementioned network hetero-
geneities, purely based on peers’ interactions with their neighbors.
Motivated by the literature on the multi-armed bandit problem,
Perigee optimally balances the tradeoff between retaining connec-
tions to knownwell-connected neighbors, and exploring new con-
nections to previously-unseen neighbors. Experimental evaluations
show that Perigee reduces the latency to broadcast by 33%. Lastly
Perigee is simple, computationally lightweight, adversary-resistant,
and compatible with the selfish interests of peers, making it an at-
tractive p2p protocol for blockchains.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Network algorithms; Peer-to-peer protocols;
Network performance evaluation; Network properties; Peer-to-peer
networks; • Theory of computation→ Distributed algorithms; •
Computingmethodologies→Multi-agent systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto proposed Bitcoin as a decentralized cur-
rency systemover a peer-to-peer (p2p) network,with the blockchain
protocol as its underlying technology formaintaining a public ledger
of payment transactions [33]. Since then, there has been a prolifer-
ation of applications leveraging the power of blockchains as a core
component, for implementing cryptocurrencies, smart contracts,
supply chain management, etc. [14]. Today, the combined market
capitalization of all cryptocurrencies is around 280 billion dollars
with a rapidly increasing user base [4].
A key problem facing blockchain systems today is scalability—for
example, the Bitcoin network can currently support a maximum of
only 10 transaction per second [41], compared to 1700 transactions
per second on Visa. A blockchain protocol functions by periodically
consolidating transactions and broadcasting them as “blocks” over
the network. Recent works have constructed new consensus pro-
tocols to improve confirmation latency and throughput in both the
permissioned [7, 36] as well as the permissionless settings [10, 24].
There have also beenmethods to compress [34] and code [13] blocks
while forwarding. Despite these improvements, a fundamental fac-
tor limiting the performance of blockchain systems is the inherent
message propagation delay introduced by the p2p network. A block
experiences delays from various factors during propagation, such
as due to link latencies and processing delays for verifying blocks
at each peer. It is known that improving the propagation delay di-
rectly improves key performance metrics of the system: transaction
throughput, latency in confirming transactions, and security [10].
Measurement studies over Bitcoin [15, 17] report that it takes on
anaverage79seconds forablock to reach90%ofnodes in thenetwork.
Whereas themedian round-trip-timebetweenhostson the Internet is
<300ms [26], the median bandwidth of Bitcoin nodes is 33Mbps [15],
and the average time taken to validate a block is <200ms [23]. Blocks
have an average size of 1MB in Bitcoin today. These numbers show
that the time it takes for a block to propagate to the majority of the
network is 40× larger than the time it takes to verify and relay a block
between two nodes (<1 or 2s).With an estimated number of less than
11,000 nodes in Bitcoin [1], and each node making connections to at
least 8 other nodes [32], a key reason for the disproportionately large
propagation delay today is due to the ineffectiveway inwhich nodes
are connected to each other (i.e., the topology) in the p2p network.
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The design of p2p networks for efficient content storage and
lookup has a long history [30, 38, 42]. However, blockchains require
only a simple broadcast primitive (for example, unicast messages
directed to a particular node or lookup for specific content are not
supported) and this primitive needs to be robust to adversarial ac-
tion. This has led to Bitcoin following a random connection policy,
where each node chooses its neighbors randomly from among a set
of known nodes. While the random graph topology is simple, robust
and provides good connectivity (from a graph theoretic standpoint),
it is oblivious to differences in round-trip-time latencies between
different nodes, heterogeneity in node bandwidth and block verifi-
cation times. This inherently worsens the overall delay experienced
by broadcasted blocks; for example, a block is likely to make sev-
eral back-and-forth trips across distant continents before reaching
a node. In this paper, we consider the question of how to optimally
connect nodes in the Bitcoin network (and blockchain p2p networks
in general), in a way that is aware of link and node heterogeneities,
so that the broadcast time of blocks is minimized.
We present Perigee, a decentralized protocol that adaptively de-
cides which neighbors a node should connect to, purely based on
the node’s past interactions with its neighbors. Our protocol is mo-
tivated by the classical multi-armed bandit problem [8]. Nodes in
Perigee balance the trade-off between retaining old neighbors with
good connectivity, and exploring new neighbors with potentially
better connectivity. In Perigee, a node quantifies its interactionswith
its neighbors by looking at the block arrival times. Neighbors that
consistently deliver blocks quickly are favored, while others are dis-
connected. Perigee also continuously forms connections to a small
number of nodes randomly, for discovering previously unseen but
well-connected nodes. Our approach of purely using block arrival
times to select neighbors is automatically tuned to heterogeneity
in link latencies, block validation delays and node bandwidth. The
end result is a topology that is very tight: experimental results show
Perigee improves overall propagation delay by 33% compared to the
state of the art (§5).
Modifying the p2p topology for faster block propagation has been
considered in prior works; e.g., in Kadcast [37] the authors propose
a structured p2p overlay as a faster alternative to the random topol-
ogy. However, such a structured topology is still oblivious to link
latencies, block validation times and node bandwidth, which renders
its performance to be only slightly better than the random topology
(§5). One way to take link latency into account is by using the geo-
graphical location of nodes, inferred from their IP addresses, to select
neighbors [5]. However, this approach does not accurately reflect
propagation latencies sincenodes frequentlyuseproxy-servers,VPN
and Tor to run nodes, not tomention potential geo-location spoofing
attacks by adversaries. Even more importantly, this approach also
remains oblivious to the differing processing power and bandwidth
possessed by different nodes.
In contrast, Perigee does not use any explicit property about a
node, and is thus much more robust to spoofing attacks. Another
line of work proposes high-speed block distribution networks (e.g.,
BloXroute [29], Falcon [2], Fibre [3]) to reduce block propagation
times. These solutions are not fully decentralized, as using them
requires nodes to place trust on the relay network. The routes in
these networks could be also susceptible to man-in-the-middle at-
tack. Nevertheless, even if such relay networks are present, Perigee
automatically adapts its topology to exploit those networks (§5.4).
Perigee naturally incentivizes nodes to follow protocol—if a node
deviates from protocol (e.g., stops relaying blocks, or does not up-
date its neighbors using Perigee), then its neighbors will penalize
the node by disconnecting from it in the future. Consequently, the
deviant node will lose out on receiving blocks in a timely manner.
Finally Perigee maintains a subset of random neighbors at all
times, thus making it less susceptible to eclipse attacks.
1.1 Background
Blockchain applications use a distributed, replicated ledger—called
the blockchain—for storing and updating, collective states of ap-
plication’s end-users. Bitcoin is a popular example of a blockchain
application. In Bitcoin, the blockchain contains the sequence of all
payment transactions made by users since the very beginning of
Bitcoin. The public nature of these transaction logs allows a payee to
unilaterally verify the authenticity of incoming payments, without
relying on third party organizations. Thus it is a fully decentralized
payment system, a property that has contributed significantly to its
growth and popularity.
1.1.1 Bitcoin architecture. Bitcoin operates over a p2p network. In
Bitcoin,when a usermakes a payment transaction, first a transaction
message specifying the sender, recipient, and payment amount is cre-
ated by the user. The transaction is then broadcast to other peers over
the network. As new transactions are propagated over the network,
special peers called miners accumulate these transactions, verify
their authenticity and consolidate them into individual transaction
blocks in a process calledmining. A block in Bitcoin can contain a few
thousand transactions today. Miners compete for mining each block,
as they receive a monetary reward (funded by transaction fees) for
mining a block. To ensure immutability in the sequence of previously
minedblocks,minersareobliged to includehashof thepreviousblock
andsolvea computationallydifficult cryptographicpuzzlewhilemin-
ing. When a block is mined, the miner shares the block with the rest
of the network by broadcasting it. A peer receiving a freshly mined
block first verifies its authenticity, before appending the block to its
local copy of the blockchain or relaying the block to other neighbors.
1.1.2 Block propagation delay and performance. Blocks are broad-
cast in Bitcoin via flooding; when a peer receives a new block, it
announces the hash of the block to all its neighbors via an INVmes-
sage. Subsequently, neighbors who have not yet received the block
respond with a GETDATAmessage requesting for the block, and the
block is relayed to them. The process repeats until all the peers in
the network have received the new block.
The performance of Bitcoin, and other cryptocurrencies, is mea-
sured by their (i) throughput, which is the average rate atwhich trans-
actions are confirmed in the blockchain per second, (ii) confirmation
latency, the time taken such that the probability for removing an
honest transaction from the blockchain becomes sufficiently small,
and (iii) security, the extent of adversarial peers the network can
tolerate before the blockchain loses its immutability property [10].
Cryptocurrencies today offer strong security guarantees, but are
lacking in their throughput and confirmation latencies compared
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to mainstream payment systems. For example, Bitcoin promises its
blockchain cannot be compromised as long as more than 50% of the
miners are honest. However, compared to the average throughput
of 1700 transactions per second in the Visa network, the average
throughput in Bitcoin today is just 3–7 transactions per second, and
the latency is 1 hour [15].
A key factor affecting the throughput, confirmation latency and
security is the propagationdelay of blocks. If the propagationdelay is
too large, then there is a higher probability ofmining of a blockwhile
another block at the same blockchain height is being propagated
across the network—a phenomenon called forking [17]—reducing
network throughput. The confirmation latency is also physically
lower bounded by the propagation delay of the underlying p2p net-
work [10]. Furthermore, a large propagation delay can help an adver-
sary to execute double spending and block-withholding attacks [39].
1.1.3 How the p2p topology impacts delay. The dynamics of block
propagation in Bitcoin has been empirically observed to follow a
pattern similar to randomized rumor spreading in networks [17].
For instance, when a block is mined and broadcast, it first spreads
exponentially fast to peers that are close to the source, before slow-
ing down exponentially and reaching the remaining peers [17, 28].
Prior works have extensively analyzed (both empirically, and the-
oretically) rumor spreading on different network topologies [19, 20],
and have shown that rumors spread substantially faster in certain
topologies than others. Specifically, scale-free graphs spread rumors
significantly faster (in sub-logarithmic time) than random graphs.
Doerr et al. [19] report that on social networks (e.g., the Twitter
topology), rumors spread even faster than on scale-free graphs.
While the rumor-spreading model is considerably simpler com-
pared to the dynamics of block propagation in Bitcoin’s network
(e.g., it does not model heterogeneity in link latencies, or bandwidth)
it illustrates the potential benefits of carefully designing the p2p
topology. An optimal peer connection protocol should not only im-
bibe essential properties of a fast rumor-spreading network and take
peer heterogeneity into account, but should also be implementable
in a decentralized manner without introducing new vulnerabilities.
1.2 Problem Statement and Contributions
We consider re-designing Bitcoin’s p2p topology, to minimize the
time taken by blocks to propagate over the network. The topology
is constructed using a fully decentralized protocol running at all the
peers. A peer may choose to not follow protocol, or even act adver-
sarially, but we assume there exist peers, whose aggregate compute
power amounts to more than 50% of the total compute power in the
network, that are honest [33]. Each honest peer seeks to connect to
a set of neighboring peers, to minimize the time it takes for a block
mined by the peer to reach a majority (e.g., 90%) of the compute
power in the network. Honest peers are also interested in receiving
blocks mined by a majority of other peers as early as possible. Our
main contributions are as follows.
Fundamental bounds on delay.We present a theoretical model
for analyzing block propagation delay in Bitcoin, that explicitlymod-
els heterogeneity in the communication latencies betweenpeers.Our
model is based on a line of work in the networking systems, which
has proposed that latencies between hosts on the Internet can be ac-
curately predicted by embedding the hosts on to a metric space [16].
With this model, we show that inter-connecting peers randomly
leads to propagation delays that are logarithmicallyworse compared
to the underlying point-to-point latencies between peers (§3.1). Con-
versely, we also show that a topology in which peers choose neigh-
bors with whom they have a small round-trip-time latency, provides
asymptotically the best possible propagation delay (§3.3).
Optimal algorithm.Wepropose Perigee, a decentralized neighbor-
selection protocol, that adaptively decides which neighbors to con-
nect to purely based on the interactions between a peer and its
neighbors (§4). Perigee is motivated by the classical multi-armed
bandit problem [8], in which an agent—faced with a decision to
choose one among many options with a priori unknown rewards—
adaptively tries the different options and zeros-in on the best choice.
A core tenet of algorithms for solving the multi-armed bandit prob-
lem is balancing exploration (trying out a previously unexplored
option) with exploitation (choosing an option that has already been
tried before). In our case, each peer is an agent that is faced with
choosing the best set of neighbors, amongdifferent choices for neigh-
bors. Interpreting the p2p topology design problem as an instance
of multi-armed bandit problem is a key novelty of our paper and,
to our best knowledge, has not been proposed before. Further, our
experiments show that the topology that is adaptively learned by
Perigee has striking statistical similarities to the theoretically opti-
mal topology (§3.3). In addition to minimizing propagation latency,
Perigee is attractive also for the following reasons:
• It is lightweight.
• It is compatible with the self-interests of peers—each peer
selfishly tries to select the best neighbors for itself.
• It supports incremental deployment: peers following Perigee
would see improvements in how quickly they can send or
receive blocks, compared to those that do not follow Perigee.
• It is robust against adversarial actions: a Perigee peer does not
need to knowmuch about a candidate neighbor (e.g., its geo-
graphical location, or the round-trip latency to the neighbor)
to decide whether to connect to it.
• It incentivizes peers to relay blocks promptly.
• It is naturally adaptive to varying hash-power. Each node
tries to optimize its distance from an average block source,
rather than from an average node.
2 SYSTEMMODEL
2.1 NetworkModel
We model Bitcoin’s p2p network as an undirected graph G(V ,E),
where V is the set of nodes, and E is the set of edges, or links, be-
tween the nodes. A node refers to a Bitcoin server (e.g., a miner), that
can accept incoming TCP connection requests from other servers
and clients. Clients on Bitcoin are end-devices that are not able to
accept incoming TCP connection requests (e.g., because they are
behind a NAT). Once a TCP connection has been established be-
tween two nodes, communication can happen in both directions.We
focus in this work, on Bitcoin servers as they form the core of the
p2p overlay—servers tend to be always on, and the time taken for a
block to propagate is largely affected by the interconnectionnetwork
between the servers. We focus on minimizing the latency of propa-
gating blocks, not transactions, in this work (we define the objective
formally in §2.2). It is well known that transaction throughput and
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confirmation latencies in Bitcoin are directly correlated with block
propagation times [10].Moreover, ap2pnetwork that isoptimized for
rapidly broadcasting blocks would also minimize transaction broad-
cast time, as clients are likely to connect to well-connected server
nodes (e.g., using [1]). However, our protocol is general, and can
readily be adapted to optimize transaction propagation times as well.
For any two nodes u,v ∈V , we assume the latency of sending a
block fromu tov or fromv tou, viaaTCPconnectionbetweenu andv ,
is a constantδ(u,v) ≥ 0. The latency here includes transmission delay,
in-network (propagation, queueing etc.) delays and protocol-specific
message exchange overheads (e.g., inv, getdata exchange in Bit-
coin)while sending a block.δ(u,v), for a pair of nodesu,v , depends on
various factors: the size of each block, the Internet access bandwidths
atu andv , the physical distance between the nodes, and the extent of
congestion in the network.We assume these factors are slowly vary-
ing compared to the timescale of our algorithm. Each nodev ∈V also
spendsafixedamountof time∆v , for cryptographicallyverifying the
authenticity of a block it receives. ∆v varies between nodes depend-
ing on their processing power. The fraction of hash power a nodev
has, relative to the total hash power of the network, is denoted by fv .
We assume blocks are periodically generated (e.g., once every
10 minutes) and broadcast over the network. The probability that
a nodev generates the block in a round is proportional to its hash
power fv . When a nodeu mines a block, or receives a block from a
neighbor, it immediately starts relaying the block to each neighborv ,
taking a time δ(u,v) to finish relaying. For simplicity we also assume
that the connection updates execute synchronously at all the nodes,
immediately after a block is broadcast on the network.
At any time, each node maintains dout=8 outgoing connections,
and has din ≤ 20 incoming connections. In practice, Bitcoin nodes
can have up to 8 outgoing and 125 incoming connections [32]. To
discover peers in the network, Bitcoin nodes also maintain a local
database called addrMan, which they regularly update by exchang-
ing messages to neighbors. A bootstrapping server provides with a
list of addresses for a freshly joining peer. However, we assume each
node know the IP addresses of all other nodes.
2.2 PerformanceMetrics
For eachv ∈V , we compute the minimum overall delay λv it takes
for a block mined and broadcast byv to reach nodes totalling to at
least 90% of the hash power in the network. The objective for each
v ∈V is to choose neighbors such thatλv isminimized. By symmetry,
this objective would equivalently also minimize the time taken by
blocks mined by a majority of other nodes to reachv .
3 BASELINEALGORITHMS
3.1 Random
The random connection policy is a simple algorithm that is widely
deployed in many cryptocurrency systems today. In this algorithm,
a node maintains a list of IP addresses of a small number of nodes
that are currently active in the network. Initially a bootstrapping
server provides the node with such a list; subsequently the list is
updated (i.e., new addresses are added, while stale ones are removed)
by gossiping any changes in the set of neighbors for each node, over
the network. Intuitively, if connections are formed randomly on a
world-wide network, then any path—and in particular the shortest
(a) (b)
Figure 1: Example of 1000 nodes embedded randomly within a
unit-square. (a) If nodes are interconnected according to a random
topology, the shortest path between two points can be much longer
than the Euclidean distance between the points. (b) If nodes are
interconnectedusinga carefullydesigned topology (e.g., a geometric
graph; see §3.3), significantly better paths, with length close to the
Euclidean distance, are possible.
path—between two nodesu,v would likely pass through intermedi-
ate nodes that are not located close to the shortest geographical route
(i.e., the geodesic) connectingu andv . Such less-than-direct paths
would prolong the propagation delays of blocks sent on the network.
Moreover, even with queueing delays on the Internet, we can show
that a random topology leads to paths with latencies significantly
larger than those of paths on optimal topologies. Based on extensive
measurement studies, prior works [16] have empirically shown that
endhosts on the Internet can be embedded on a high-dimensional
metric space (e.g.,R5) such that themetric distance between any two
endhosts accurately predicts the communication latency between
the hosts. However, the paths on a randomly connected network
are unlikely to remain close to the geodesic shortest route between
hosts, on the embedded high-dimensional space.
Example. To illustrate this, consider an example of a network em-
bedded in the unit square [0,1] × [0,1], as shown in Figure 1. The
green points within the square are drawn uniformly randomly and
represent the nodes in the network. The Euclidean distance | |u−v | |2
between any two nodes u,v is the one-way latency of sending a
message (e.g., a transaction, or a block) fromu tov or vice-versa.1
Now, consider connecting each node in the unit-square randomly to
3 other nodes. Figure 1(a) shows the shortest path on this topology,
between twonodesa andb that are closest to the bottom-left and top-
right corner of the square. However, due to the meandering nature
of paths in a random topology, the latency between a and b is much
greater than the point-to-point latency | |a−b | |2 between them. In
contrast, a geometric graph topology (to be discussed shortly in §3.3)
hasa shortestpathbetweena andb that ismuchcloser to thegeodesic
shortest path (straight line between a andb), as shown in Figure 1(b).
We formally show the suboptimality of the random topology next.
Suboptimality of the random algorithm. Let [0,1]d be the d-
dimensional hypercube (d ≥ 2), equipped with the Euclidean metric,
and letV = {x1,x2,...,xn } denote the nodes in the network. To model
the point-to-point latencies between different pairs of nodes, i.e., the
latency between pairs of nodes if they are directly connected to each
1From the literature and results on metric-embedding of Internet hosts, we assume
that message latency fromu tov is equal to the latency fromv tou .
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other, we consider an embedding ofV on to [0,1]d , in which each
node xi is mapped to a point Xi chosen uniformly randomly over
[0,1]d . The point-to-point latency between any two nodes xi ,x j ∈V ,
is then simply | |Xi−X j | |2.
Next, to model random connections between nodes, for each pair
ofnodesxi ,x j weletxi andx j havea linkbetweenthemwithprobabil-
ityp, independent of other links. Equivalently, we can consider each
pair of pointsXi ,X j on the embedded space to have a link between
themwith probability p, independent of other links. The resulting
random graph of points {X1,X2,...,Xn } is denoted by G˜(V˜ ,E˜). The
network latency dist(i,j) between any two pointsXi ,X j is the time
taken for a message broadcast by node i (resp. node j) to reach node
j (resp. node i). This is computed as the total weight of edges on the
shortest path betweenXi andX j onG˜ , where theweight of each edge
(Xu ,Xv ) ∈ E˜ is given by | |Xu−Xv | |2. Clearly, the maximum point-to-
point latency between any two points is bounded by
√
d , which is
the Euclidean distance between the diagonal points [0,0,...,0] and
[1,1,...,1] on the hypercube. However, due to the random nature of
the graph, the typical network latency between any twonodes i,j can
be a logarithmic factor worse as shown by the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 ([22]). For any pair of nodes xi ,x j ∈V andp ≤clogn/n,
where c=c(n)=O(1), we have
dist(i,j)≥ (logn)
1− 1d
8d3/2ed (loglogn)2c1/d | |Xi−X j | |2, (1)
with probability 1−o(1).
(Proof in Freize et al. [22].)
In Theorem 1 above,p ≤clogn/n connotes a small average degree
of clogn per node in the network. The latency bound in Equation (1)
holds asymptotically almost surely for any pair of nodes i,j because
of our assumption that each node is embedded on to a random point
in the hypercube.2 In reality, while connection patterns across nodes
can change randomly with time, the point-to-point latencies be-
tween nodesmay not vary significantly. Nevertheless, for nodes that
are not too close to each other, Theorem 1 suggests that the latency
between them on a random network must be logarithmically worse.
3.2 Connecting Based on Geography
Akey reason the randomly formed topology suffers from suboptimal
path delays (Theorem 1), is due to a lack of sufficient connectivity
between nodes that are in close proximity (i.e., have small delay) to
each other in the hypercube. If the size of the network is large, each
node is likely to choose neighbors that are all far away, as the number
of distant nodes is much greater than the number of nearby nodes.
Therefore, even if amessage reaches the general vicinity of node fast,
it likely needs to spend a disproportionate amount of time to actually
reach the node, due to the lack of any direct, low-delay paths. To
ensure good connectivity in this “last mile”, it is desirable for nodes
to connect not only to nodes that are far away, but also those close by.
In practice, it is difficult for nodes to a priori know the round-trip-
times to other nodes, without actually connecting to themfirst. How-
ever, recent work [11] has proposed using the geographical location
of a node—which can be estimated based on it’s IP address [27]—as
2This leads to any two points Xi ,X j being "well-separated" on the hypercube with
high probability.
a proxy for predicting whether the connection latency to the node is
likely to be large or small. If the geographical locations of nodes are
known, then a natural method to improve the random protocol, is
to select a few neighbors among those that are geographically close,
and then choose the rest of the neighbors randomly. For instance,
if we cluster nodes according to the continents they are from, then a
node located in North America can have four neighbors that are also
in North America, and four other neighbors from other continents
(e.g., Asia, Europe).
In our evaluations (§5), we show that the above protocol, does
indeed perform better compared to the random protocol. However,
the question remains whether this protocol can be improved even
further. For instance, we have clustered nodes based on the conti-
nent in which they are located, but it is unclear if a different way
of grouping nodes would have fared better. We also assign 50% of
a node’s connections to in-cluster nodes, and the remaining 50% to
nodes outside the cluster. The optimal balance between the num-
ber of connections made within and outside of the cluster, is again
unclear. In practice a node may be malicious and try to spoof it’s
true geographical location (e.g., via proxies, or VPN), which can also
significantly degrade the utility of the algorithm. Lastly, the assump-
tion that the geographic distance to a node dictates the latency to
it is only a coarse approximation [26].
3.3 Theoretical Optimum
To understand how much better an optimal topology can be, we
consider a geometric graph in which two nodes are connected if
the latency between them is less than a threshold r . Compared to
the random topology, in which neighbors are selected completely
agnostic of their delay or geography, the geometric graph represents
the other extreme where all neighbors are chosen to be within some
small delay. Following the model for latency in which nodes are
randomly embedded within a d-dimensional unit-hypercube (§3.1),
we can show that the shortest path distance between any two nodes
is at most a constant factor larger than their Euclidean distance.
Theorem 2 ([21, 40]). For a geometric graph with threshold r =
Θ((logn/n)1/d ), there exists a constant ξ such that for any two nodes
xi ,x j in the same connected component with | |Xi −X j | |2 = ω(r ), it
holds that dist(i,j) is at most ξ | |Xi−X j | |2 with probability 1−o(1).
(Proof in Friedrich et al. [21])
The superior path delay of the geometric graph stems from nodes
having a strong connectivity to other nodes in their local vicinity,
which creates paths traversing closely to the geodesic between any
two nodes (Figure 1(b)). We note that the geometric graph is not
the only construction with order-optimal path delay—a recent line
of work [6, 18] has proposed other efficient topology constructions
also providing order-optimal path delays, for points embedded in
a metric space. For example, in Chan et al. [12], the authors propose
a decentralized algorithm for constructing a low-stretch spanner
where the graph distance between any two nodes is at most a con-
stant factor worse than their Euclidean distance. Their algorithm is
also robust against node faults.
Themetric embeddingmodel for node latencies, discussed in §3.1,
§3.2 and the present section, is useful as a simple, tractable theoret-
ical model for analyzing competing topology constructions. While
themodel captures first-order differences in point-to-point latencies
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across nodes, blocks in the Bitcoin network also suffer from delays
due to transmission (if the available bandwidth is small, relative to
the block size), and block validation. Measurement studies on the
Bitcoin network, report a wide skew in these delays across different
nodes; e.g., in one study [15] conducted in 2015, the bandwidth of
Bitcoin server nodes was found to vary from 3 Mbps to 186 Mbps.
Bitcoin’s block size has also varied over the years, from 87KB in 2012
to around 1 MB today. These numbers are likely to change as nodes
continuously invest in better network infrastructure, compute and
storage hardware, and as the Bitcoin community introduces higher-
level protocol changes . To optimize the p2p topology in an evolving
landscape, it is desirable for a neighborhood-selection protocol to be
adaptive to changes, while at the same time have behavioral similar-
ities to optimal topology constructions such as the geometric graph.
Perigee is such a protocol; we discuss it next.
4 PERIGEE
Perigee is a decentralized algorithm that adaptively learns to form
optimal peer connections, purely based on a node’s interactions
with its neighbors. Unlike hand-crafted protocols which often re-
quire extensive manual tuning to optimize protocol parameters for
individual blockchain networks, Perigee is a flexible learning algo-
rithm that automatically finds the best topology for any network
setting. In Perigee, nodes continuously monitor the promptness of
block delivery from each of their neighboring nodes, and decide
whether to retain their neighbors or explore connecting to other
potentially better-connected peers. Since each node tries to locally
find the best set of neighbors it can connect to, Perigee naturally
benefits the self-interests of peers. In §5 we show through extensive
experimental evaluations, that our protocol also globally optimizes
block propagation delays under diverse settings.
4.1 AlgorithmOverview
Perigee operates on top of existing block distribution protocols, and
does not change the format of blocks or the gossip protocols used
for broadcasting them. Instead it simply decides what is the best set
of neighbors for a node to connect to, for a given block size and gos-
sip protocol. Starting from an arbitrary initial set of neighbors (e.g,
obtained randomly from a bootstrapping server), a node in Perigee
periodically evaluates its current set of neighbors, to decide which
neighbors offer the fastest connectivity to the rest of the network.
Connections to those neighbors providing a good connectivity are re-
tained, while the rest are disconnected. Additionally, Perigee also pe-
riodically connects to a small number of randomnodes, as ameans to
discover previously unknown but potentially well-connected peers.
In Perigee, a neighbor is evaluated purely based on timestamp
measurements of when blocks, or advertisements for blocks, were
received from the neighbor.3 Based on these measurements, a real-
valued score is computed and assigned to each neighbor, which is
then used to decide which subset of neighbors to retain. Using block
reception times to scoreneighbors, is a keynovelty inPerigee andhas
several advantages compared to algorithms discussed in §3. A node
is identified only by its IP address, and not based on auxiliary infor-
mation such as its geographical location. This makes our algorithm
3Our protocol is general, and can also be used with timestamp measurements of
transactions received from neighbors.
Algorithm 1: Perigee: Algorithm template for updating
neighbors of nodev after each round.
input :neighbors Γv , outgoing neighbors Γov , set of blocks
B mined during the round, and observation set Ov
output :updated set of outgoing neighbors Γov for next round
/* Score each neighbor based on measurements
collected in Ov using a scoring algorithm
(see §4.2, §4.3 for different scoring methods) */
score(u)← ScoringAlgorithm(Ov ), for each ngbr.u ∈ Γov
/* Retain subset of dv neighbors with best score */
Γov ←{u ∈ Γov :score(u) ∈ best dv scores of nodes in Γov }
/* Additionally
connect to ev random peers for exploration */
Γov ←Γov ∪(ev randomly chosen neighbors fromV )
robust to geo-spoofing attacks. Moreover, by explicitly using block
arrival times for scoring neighbors, Perigee automatically takes into
account heterogeneities, such as variations in link latencies across
geographically separated nodes, and variations in hash power. The
resulting topology therefore, has a good connectivity to nodes with
high hash power, rather than good connectivity in a simpler graph
theoretic sense (e.g., low diameter).
To simplify our exposition, we present Perigee (Algorithm 1)
under the network model of §2. The algorithm proceeds in rounds,
where each round spans the time taken to mine and broadcast K
unique blocks B= {b1,b2,...,bK } over the p2p network. For a node
v ∈V , letΓv denote thesetofv’sneighbors inG , and letΓov ⊆ Γv denote
v’s outgoing neighbors. When a block b ∈ B is broadcast during a
round, we let tbu,v be the local time atv when b was received from
neighboru ∈ Γv . We set tbu,v =∞ if block b was never relayed tov by
u. During a round, each nodev collects information aboutwhen each
block was received from its neighbors in the form of an observation
setOv = {(b,u,tbu,v ) :b ∈B,u ∈ Γv }. Note that it is possible forv to hear
about a block for the first time from a non-outgoing neighbor. The
tuples collected inOv allows Perigee to rate how quickly a neighbor
relays blocks relative to other neighbors, and retain connections to
the best subset ofdv (e.g.,dv =6) neighbors at the end of each round.
Neighbors are evaluated using a scoring function, which estimates
the maximum delay taken by a neighbor to forward 90% of blocks
to the nodev . In addition, Perigee also connects to a small number
ev (e.g., ev =2) of random peers during each round, for discovering
previously unknown peers with good connectivity.
Wepropose twodifferent scoringmethods, dependingonwhether
each neighbor is scored individually (§4.2), or groups of neighbors
are jointly assigned a score (§4.3). In the latter case, the score is an
estimate of the maximum delay taken by the group of neighbors as
a whole to forward 90% of blocks tov . The joint scoring of different
neighbor groups is better suited to our objective, since each peer
ultimately just desires to receive blocks as fast as possible, regardless
ofwhich specific neighbor forwards the block. Certain blocksmaybe
relayed fast by someneighbors,while other blocks are relayed fast by
the remaining neighbors—as long as, together, the set of neighboring
nodes result in a quick delivery of amajority of blocks, it is beneficial
for the node. However, accurately evaluating scores for all possible
groups of neighbors is computationally expensive, and therefore
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Figure 2: Observe that lcb(u4) ≥ lcb(u) ∀u ∈ Γov , ucb(u3) ≤ ucb(u)
∀u ∈ Γov . Moreover, lcb(u4) > ucb(u3) and so the neighbor to be
removed (bad_nbr ) isu4.
we propose faster approximate methods. In our evaluations (§5), we
find both the independent scoring and approximate joint scoring
methods to be competitive.
4.2 Scoring Each Neighbor Individually
4.2.1 Vanilla Scoring. We first consider a simple scoring method,
called VanillaScoring, to illustrate how for each neighboru ∈ Γov
of a nodev , the timestamps tbu,v of blocks b ∈B broadcast during a
round can be used to estimateu’s score. Recall that a timestamp tbu,v
recorded in the observation setOv of a nodev corresponds to the
local wall-clock time when the block b was received atv . In order to
judgehowwell aneighbor is connected to the rest of thenetwork, it is
desirable to know the relative time betweenwhen a blockwasmined,
and when it was delivered by the neighbor (i.e., the propagation
delay). However, as it is difficult for a nodev to know the precise time
whenablockwasmined,weuse the relative timedifferencesbetween
when a block is forwarded by different neighbors, as a proxy for the
propagation delay. For a block b, the first time it was received byv
from some neighbor is at time tbv :=minu ∈Γv tbu,v . The timestamps
inOv are then revised relative to times blocks were first received by
v , and a time-normalized observation set O˜v is computed as
O˜v = {(b,u,tbu,v −tbv ) :u ∈ Γv ,b ∈B}. (2)
In VanillaScoring, the score for a neighboru ∈ Γov is simply com-
puted as the 90th percentile of the multi-set of relative timestamps
T˜u,v := (t˜ : (b,u,t˜) ∈ O˜v ) observed in a round. This scoring approach
naturally reflects a node’s preference to retain an outgoing neighbor
fromwhich it received transactions relatively earlier. The lower the
score for a neighbor, the higher is the preference for nodev to retain
the neighbor in next round.
4.2.2 UCB Scoring. In the VanillaScoringmethod, propagation
delay estimates for individual neighbors (90th percentile of rela-
tive timestamp observations) are likely to be noisy if the number
of blocks |B | in a round is small. The noise here arises due to the
randomness in which node mines a block each time (§1.1). While
increasing |B | by increasing the duration of each round improves
accuracyof our estimates, it also slowsdown theoverall convergence
time of the algorithm.4 To improve the accuracy of the VanillaS-
coring estimates, without sacrificing on convergence time, we pro-
pose a second scoring method motivated by the Upper Confidence
Bound (UCB) algorithm for multi-armed bandits [8]. In the UCB-
Scoringmethod, a nodemaintains an estimate of propagation delay
for a neighbor, based on observed timestamps, and also computes
lower and upper confidence bounds for it. If a neighbor has been
connected tov for longer than one round, then the estimates and
confidence bounds for the neighbor are computed not only using
the observationsOv made during the current round, but also using
past observations available for the neighbor. For a neighboru ∈ Γov ,
let T˜u,v (−i) denote the multi-set of relative timestamps obtained
during a round i rounds before the present round. Supposing nodeu
has beenv’s neighbor for the past ru,v rounds. In the UCBScoring
approach, we use a multi-set of relative timestamp observations
≈
Tu,v = (t˜ : (b,u,t˜) ∈ ∪−ru,vi=0 T˜u,v (−i) such that t˜ <∞) for a neighbor
u.5 The propagation delay foru is estimated as the 90th percentile
of
≈
Tu,v , and its confidence bounds are computed as
ucb(u)=90percentile( ≈Tu,v )+c
√√
log(| ≈Tu,v |)
2×| ≈Tu,v |
(3)
lcb(u)=90percentile( ≈Tu,v )−c
√√
log(| ≈Tu,v |)
2×| ≈Tu,v |
, (4)
where ucb and lcb denote the upper and lower confidence bounds
respectively [8], and 90percentile(·) computes the 90th percentile
of its argument. At the end of each round, in the UCBScoring ap-
proach we check whethermaxu ∈Γov (lcb(u))>minu ∈Γov (ucb(u)), and
if so,v disconnects from the neighbor argmaxu ∈Γov (lcb(u)) and con-
nects to a randomnewneighbor instead; otherwise the current set of
neighbors are retained for the next round. Figure 2 shows an example
of upper and lower confidence bounds for a set of eight neighbors.
Nodeu4 will be disconnected at the end of the round in this example.
Updating the set of neighbors thisway based on confidence intervals,
avoids accidentally disconnecting from a well-connected neighbor
that has a poor 90th percentile score due to randomness in mining
and lack of sufficient measurement samples.
4.3 Scoring Groups of Neighbors Jointly
Next, we present an alternative scoring method, SubsetScoring,
where scores are assigned to each groupγv ⊂ Γov of neighbors (of a
certain cardinality, e.g., 6) instead of to individual nodes. At the end
of a round, the group of neighbors having the best score are retained
and neighbors that are not part of this group are disconnected. As be-
fore, a small number of neighboring connections aremade randomly
in each round to encourage exploration.
To avoid the computational overhead of exhaustively evaluating
scores for all possible subsets of neighbors, we consider a simpler,
but approximate, greedy approach in which the neighbors to be
retained are selected one by one. First, the algorithm selects the
neighbor u1 ∈ Γov having the best 90th percentile score in the rela-
tive timestamp observation multi-set T˜u,v (§4.2.1). If k neighbors
u1,u2,...,uk have been selected, the (k+1)st neighbor is selected by
4We illustrate convergence of Perigee empirically in our experiments in §5.
5Note that the union∪−ru,vi=0 T˜u,v (−i) is a multi-set union.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3:Minimumdelay to nodes totaling 90% of network’s hash power on random, geographic, Perigee-Vanilla, Perigee-Subset, Perigee-UCB,
Kademlia and the fullly-connected graph (denoted as ideal). (a) All nodes have the same hash power. (b) Nodes have a hash power drawn from
an exponential distribution.
first computing a transformed observation set
≈
Ov (u1,u2, ...,uk ) =
{(b,u,min(t˜bu,v ,min1≤i≤k t˜bui ,v )) : b ∈ B,u ∈ Γov \{u1,u2, ... ,uk }},
followed by the multi-set of relative timestamps
≈
Tu,v (u1,...,uk )=
(≈t : (b,u, ≈t) ∈ ≈Ov (u1, ... ,uk )) for each neighbor u ∈ Γov \{u1, ... ,uk }.
The transformation essentially avoids penalizing nodes that do not
have good connectivity to a certain part of the network, to which
the neighbors already chosen have a good connectivity. The node
u ∈ Γov \{u1,...,uk } with the lowest 90percentile(
≈
Tu,v (u1,...,uk ))
value is finally selected as the (k + 1)st choice. Thus, each time a
neighbor is chosen whose connectivity to the rest of the network
best complements the other neighbors selected thus far. As in §4.2,
once (dv −ev ) neighbors are selected, nodev also randomly selects
ev nodes as part of exploration. This set of dv nodes arev’s updated
set of neighbors that it will monitor in the next round.
5 EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of Perigee, and compare it against the
baseline algorithms of §3. Our experiments are based on a Python
simulator we built following the network model of §2.6 We describe
the experimental setting in §5.1. Following this, we evaluate Perigee
on a variety of different network conditions (§5.2–§5.4).
5.1 Experimental Setup
Network setting.We retrieved a publicly available list of 9408 Bit-
coin nodes [1], and use a randomly sampled subset of 1000 nodes
from it, for all our experiments. The “default” setting for hash power
of nodes, block validation times, link propagation delay, and block
size in our experiments are described below. In §5.2, §5.3,we consider
a broader range of settings for each of hash power, block validation
times respectively; in each case, while we explore different settings
6Source code and datasets are available at https://github.com/mori94/perigee.
for one attribute, we fix the other attributes to their “default” setting
unless specified otherwise. The default settings are as follows.
(1) Hash power. We assume hash power is distributed uniformly
across all the nodes.
(2) Propagation delay. The dataset of Bitcoin nodes [1] includes in-
formation about the geographical location of each node. Nodes are
spreadacross sevengeographic regions:NorthAmerica, SouthAmer-
ica, Europe, Asia, Africa, China, andOceania.We set the propagation
latency between any two nodes according to their geographical lo-
cations, using the iPlane latency measurement dataset [31, 37].
(3) Block size.We assume block sizes are small, relative to the band-
width available at the nodes. Hence the overall block broadcasting
delay is dominated by the link propagation delays, and block vali-
dation delays, in the default setting.
(4) Block validation time. Each node has a mean block processing
time of 50 ms.
In addition, in §5.4 we consider a scenario where nodes have access
to a high-speed block distribution network such as BloXroute [29].
Each node creates 8 outgoing connections, and accepts up to 20 in-
coming connections. If a node already has 20 incoming connections,
any additional connection request is declined by the node.
Algorithms compared.We implement Perigee under the scoring
methods discussed in §4.2.1, §4.2.2, §4.3, and name them Perigee-
Vanilla, Perigee-UCB and Perigee-Subset respectively. For Perigee-
Vanilla and Perigee-Subset, we define a round such that |B | = 100
blocks aremined during each round; for Perigee-UCBwe use shorter
rounds in which only one block (|B | = 1) is mined each round. In
all of the Perigee variants, a node selects two neighbors randomly
for exploration every round (§4). As baseline algorithms, we con-
sider the random connection algorithm (§3.1), geography-based
connection algorithm (§3.2) and a structured p2p topology based on
Kademlia [37]. For these baselines, we do not change the topology
with each round. We also consider a topology in which each node
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Figure 4: (a) Delay distributions for Perigee with 0.1×, 0.5×, 5× and 10× the default node delay. (b) Setting with a small number (10%) of high
hash powerminers. (c) Performance in the presence of a low-latency block distribution network such as bloXroute.
is connected to all other nodes, to obtain a theoretical lower bound
on block propagation times.
Performancemetric. For each node, we compute the time it takes
for a block broadcast by the node to reach 50% and 90% of the hash
power in the network. We repeat each experiment three times using
independently sampled link latencies, and plot the mean propaga-
tion times for different nodes in ascending order; we also show error
bars at the 100th, 300th, 500th, 700th and 900th node. Note that the
nodes corresponding to the same x-coordinate value may not be the
same node in the network.
5.2 Hash Power
We first consider the setting where all the attributes—hash power,
link propagation latencies, block validation times, block size—take
their default setting (§5.1) and plot the results in Figure 3(a). The
Perigee-Subset and -UCB algorithm achieve around 33% and 11%
lower delay respectively compared to randomneighbor selection, in-
dicating that switching neighbors based on their scores helps reduce
the block propagation delays. Connecting based on node geography
does help lower delay compared to random selection, however it is
still 40% worse than Perigee-Subset at the 500th node. The Kadem-
lia topology is slightly worse than even the geographic topology.
While the 90-percentile delays in Perigee converge as the number of
rounds increases, we observe the 50-percentile delays do not exhibit
a similar monotonicity. This is because Perigee chooses neighbors
only to optimize nodes’ 90-percentile delays.
Since Perigee-Subset is slightly better than Perigee-UCB or -
Vanilla, for the reminder we have used Perigee-Subset as the pre-
ferred scoring method. Next, we consider the same setting as above
but where the hash power of the nodes are sampled from an expo-
nential distribution (of mean 1), and normalized to 1 (Figure 3(b)).
The results show a similar performance pattern as in Figure 3(a) with
Perigee-Subset being 33% better than random.
5.3 Processing Delay
In Figure 4, we vary the block validation time to 0.1×, 0.5×, 5× and
10× its default value. As shown in the Figure, for small values of
node delay (0.1×), Perigee finds a topology with delays at least 62%
better than random. However, as the node delay increases, Perigee
approaches the random protocol’s performance. This is expected,
since with large processing delays the 90th percentile delay is dic-
tated by the number of nodes on the shortest paths to nodes (i.e., the
Figure 5: Histograms of the edge latencies in the p2p graph obtained
after theexecutionofvariousalgorithmsunderuniformhashpower.
diameter of the network). With node degree bounded by a constant,
the diameter is lower-bounded by the logarithm in number of nodes,
which is achieved by the random topology.
5.4 Fast Distribution Networks
The Bitcoin network is known to have a small number of mining
pools that contribute to most of the hash power in the network. To
simulate such a network,we randomly select 10%of the nodes and as-
sign them 90% of the network’s total hash power; we also set the link
propagation latencies between the high-power miners to be much
smaller than their default values. In this network, it is desirable for
peers to be directly connected to at least one of the high-power min-
ers. As shown by the results in Figure 4(b), Perigee can exploit and
explore the network to get much closer to the ideal delay in a fully-
connected network compared to baselines. We also simulate fast
block relay networks, by considering 100 nodes organized as a tree
topology with low-propagation-latency links. The block validation
delays for these 100 nodes are also set to be 10% of their default value.
Even here, as before, our results in Figure 4(c) show that Perigee can
approach the fully-connected network baseline closely.
5.5 What does Perigee learn?
In Figure 5 we observe that the distribution of edge latencies of the
p2p network obtained in all the four algorithms are bimodal. The
lower mode is mostly populated by intra-continental edges with
smaller edge latencies whereas the upper mode is mostly populated
by inter-continental edges with larger edge latencies. For Perigee-
subset, the latencies of bulk of the edges are populated around the
lower mode. On the other hand, this is not the case in random and
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geometric. This implies that over the course of execution of Perigee-
subset algorithm, nodes learn to select those outgoing neighbors
with which they have smaller edge latency.
6 DISCUSSION
We have proposed Perigee, an adaptive algorithmmotivated by the
multi-armed bandit problem, that finds efficient p2p topologies for
reducing block propagation times in blockchain networks.While we
have empirically illustrated the effectiveness of Perigee, we believe
our work is only a first step and important questions—both theoret-
ical issues and practical considerations—need to be addressed for a
more thorough understanding of the problem.
Theoretically analysis of Perigee, e.g., to study its convergence
behavior and characterize its "regret" (how far it is from the "best"
topology), is a crucial topic for future research. In Perigee, one way
to launch an Eclipse attack [25] is for an adversary to provide blocks
earlier than other nodes, thus gaining a peer’s trust and dominating
its neighborhood. The presence of random neighbors in Perigee
provides some mitigation against this attack, a formal analysis of
which is left for futurework. Another dimension of analysis involves
analyzing the performance under node churn [9, 35], with limited
peer addresses known at each node (that are dynamically updated
as part of a peer-discovery protocol).
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